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During the first week of December, the U.S. President brought together the leaders of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to sign a truce. He promised an end to long-standing fighting in the volatile eastern DRC, framing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to generate significant profit.

Weeks later, however, a sharply contrasting approach to conflict emerged. It was declared that U.S. forces had executed Christmas Day airstrikes in north-west Nigeria, targeting sites connected to the Islamic State (IS). Via a statement posted online, the President declared, “I have previously warned these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

An Evident Shift in Policy

This contrast encapsulates the defining principle of the U.S. approach to sub-Saharan Africa in this administration: a moving away from advocating for democracy and human rights in favor of a stated focus on trade and stopping hostilities—even as this aligns with the new aerial operations in Nigeria is an open question.

“Our view has shifted from Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a slogan commonly used for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” said a top U.S. diplomat on a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

A presidential representative reinforced this, saying the President “views Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American investment, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations achieve stability, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Strategic Results and Mixed Signals

This pivot is consequential, but observers caution it is too soon to assess its effects. The approach is influenced by the President’s direct manner, which has included feuds with long-standing U.S. partners and derogatory comments about Africans.

“The organizing principle is, if it’s in the long-term or short-term interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” said a senior fellow for Africa studies at a prominent foreign policy council.

Major actions have included:

• Shutting down the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. Research forecasts this could lead to millions of preventable deaths globally by 2030, with a sizable share in Africa.
• Enacting visa restrictions on citizens from numerous African countries and suspending most refugee admissions.
• Starting a global tariff campaign that has harmed African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Allowing a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to expire without renewal.

Diplomatic Neglect and Friction

In contrast to his recent predecessors, the President avoided sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His most notable engagement with African affairs was dubbing nations on the continent with a derogatory term, which he later acknowledged using.

“Africa sits at dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for the President, but for the administration in general,” remarked the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which devoted only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A notable disagreement has broken out with South Africa, apparently influenced by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The idea of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa fits perfectly now in U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” observed a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Business-Like Diplomacy and Conditional Intervention

A comparable standoff emerged with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This collided with Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation composed between Christians and Muslims and plagued by security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts said that the stern rhetoric may have prompted the government into greater action on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had approved the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

Trump has made no secret his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has mediated in the Congo conflict and sent an envoy to try to forge a peace deal in Sudan’s civil war, so far without success. While the Congo deal seems to have been broken quickly, it “helps to at least introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” said one conflict expert.

An Echo of Competitors

Experts see the new U.S. approach as similar to that of other major powers like Russia and China, who have increased their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on strategic interests.

“It represents a belated recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” commented one foreign policy analyst.

In practice, the revised strategy likely means that “a state that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The diplomacy that we are talking about does not seek to spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a transactional posture towards Africa,” the observer stated.